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Abstract: As new actors in environmental policy, environmental NGOs have
come under analysis in the fields of policy science and political science. This
paper discusses how technological innovation, which plays a vital role in solving
global environmental problems, is stimulated and deployed in the market by the
activities of environmental NGOs. Specifically described are the decision-making
factors of Japanese and German manufacturers in developing and commercial-
izing ozone- and climate-friendly (hydrocarbon) refrigerator technology  a
technological breakthrough currently sold on the world market brought about
by Greenpeace Germany in collaboration with German manufacturers. The
concept of “strategic bridging” is used to analyze, through a Japan-Germany
comparison, the role of environmental NGOs in technological innovation and its
deployment, and their influence on business and industry, whether direct or
through the mobilization of public opinion. The Matsushita Refrigeration
Company is highlighted for analysis in the Japanese context as the first company
in Japan to make the commercialization of ozone- and climate-friendly domestic
refrigerators an objective. Matsushita Refrigeration was also the main strategic
target of Greenpeace Japan’s refrigerator campaign.
Keywords: NGO, strategic bridging, ozone depletion, climate change, technolog-
ical innovation, hydrocarbon refrigerators
1. Introduction
Under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
(Montreal Protocol) adopted in , the parties to the protocol agreed upon
concrete phase-out schedules of ozone depleting substances (ODSs) including
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and initiated implementations which would phase
them out. Due to efforts under the protocol, the world consumption of ODSs in
developed countries had reduced by  percent in 	 compared to the base
year of 




staggering reduction accounts for the Montreal Protocol’s reputation as an
epoch-making example of international cooperation in the protection of the
global environment.
The Montreal Protocol has not been an unqualified success, however. One
criticism is that the Protocol created a disruptive interaction between ozone layer
protection and climate change policies by encouraging the use of
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) worldwide (Matsumoto ; Oberthür ). HFCs
were developed by CFC producers to substitute CFCs and
hydrochloroflurorocarbons (HCFCs). HFCs do not deplete the ozone layer, but are
potent greenhouse gases.
Full-scale commercial production of HFCs began at the beginning of the s,
despite a number of reports submitted to the United Nations Environmental
Programme (UNEP) conference as early as January  which pointed out the
high global warming potentials (GWPs) of HFCs. The early reports were backed
up later by two major reports: the First UNEP Scientific Assessment Panel report
() and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) First
Assessment Report (). However, primarily because evidence showed that the
ozone layer was depleting rapidly, encouragement for the use of HFCs as effective
substitutes for CFCs continued largely unabated (Matsumoto ).
At the end of the s, international environmental organizations such as
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth (FoE), who had been active in campaigning
for the early phasing out of CFCs and other ODSs, started campaigning against
the shift to the halocarbons	 that were replacing them, namely, HFCs and HCFCs.
The latter came under criticism as potent greenhouse gases which also deplete
ozone. However, the halocarbon related industry and most of the major developed
countries’ governments insisted that there were no better alternatives to CFCs
than HCFCs and HFCs  in particular in the refrigeration and rigid insulation
sectors. It was argued that the only option would be to return to CFCs, if HFCs
or HCFCs were prohibited.
This impasse came to a head over the use of domestic refrigerators, discussed
in the case study of this paper. Prior to the s, CFCs had been used (and are
still used in some developing countries) in domestic refrigeration, both as a
blowing agent for rigid foam insulation and as a refrigerant. By the early s,
refrigerator manufacturers in the U. S., Europe and Japan had decided upon HFC-
a
 as a refrigerant. As a substitute blowing agent for insulation, the U. S. and
Japan opted to use HCFC and Germany chose to cut the amount of CFC used in
their foaming method by 	 percent. In each case, the manufacturers involved
had invested heavily in commercializing refrigerators using HFC-a. By
contrast, Greenpeace focused its efforts on finding an alternative to halocarbon
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refrigerator technology. These efforts reached fruition when Greenpeace
Germany  in cooperation with a refrigerator manufacturer in the former East
Germany and a municipal research institute in the former West Germany 
brought about a technological breakthrough with the development of
“Greenfreeze”, a non-halocarbon refrigerator. The majority of Greenfreeze
refrigerators use hydrocarbons such as isobutane or a mix of propane and butane
as a refrigerant and cyclopentane as a blowing agent for insulation.
Hydrocarbons do not harm the ozone layer, and the GWPs of hydrocarbons are
negligible. Moreover, the energy efficiency of hydrocarbon refrigerators
compares favorably with halocarbon-using refrigerators performing equally well
or even better than refrigerators using HFC-a, depending on the products
being compared.
By targeting the domestic refrigerator, an electrical appliance familiar to
most homes in industrialized economies, Greenpeace Germany was able to
stimulate a market demand for non-halocarbon domestic refrigerators which
exerted a powerful influence on the German manufacturers’ decision-making in
terms of the commercialization of non-halocarbon refrigerator technology in
Germany. Greenpeace’s concern with regard to non-halocarbon domestic
refrigerators was prompted by the likely burgeoning of the refrigerator market in
developing countries: the transnational NGO was anxious to prevent halocarbon
alternatives from dominating markets in developing countries at a time when
consumer demand for domestic refrigerators could be expected to grow rapidly.
The above indicates how the international political context of HFC issues
was a major underlying factor in Greenpeace’s drive to deal with HFCs through
technological innovation. Intergovernmental treaties in place at the time,
including subsidiary mechanisms that dealt or rather did not deal with HFC
issues, played a crucial role in prompting the NGO to act. HFCs had slipped
through the net of international ozone and climate treaties for a long time before
appearing on the agenda over the course of negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol,
despite the fact that their high GWPs were recognized by the parties of the
treaties. In the intergovernmental negotiations for the Montreal Protocol, for
instance, the need to address the risks in using HFCs was raised a number of
times, but was set aside as a problem for the climate treaties on the grounds that
HFCs do not deplete ozone. Neither the Vienna Convention for the Protection
of the Ozone Layer nor the Montreal Protocol include requirements relating to the
global warming or environmental impacts of HFCs, and the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol likewise failed
to establish institutional links with ozone regimes already in place. In ,
parties to the UNFCCC and the Montreal Protocol adopted decisions (/CP.  ;
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X/ ) recommending a joint workshop of experts from two panels  the IPCC
and the UNEP Technology and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP)  on three
industrial gases listed by the Kyoto Protocol: HFCs, perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and
sulphur hexafluoride (SF). Up until this time, the parties responsible for
negotiating ozone and climate change policies had largely relied on unofficial
communications between one another for dealing with HFCs. Even now,
international coordination of policies and measures proposed by the E.U. and
Switzerland within successive agendas of the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) of
the UNFCCC remain at odds with the views of Japan, the U.S. and other countries
which believe policies and measures on the three gases should be decided by
individual governments. In accordance with a  decision by COP  (/CP.  ),
IPCC and TEAP compiled an IPCC/TEAP Special Report in  on the scientific
and technical aspects and policies of the Kyoto Protocol’s industrial gases such as
HFCs and PFCs. It still remains unclear, however, whether there will be any
agreement on remedial policies and measures on HFCs coordinated on the
international level.
Two international policy factors may have been particularly influential in
prompting Greenpeace to take up the halocarbon issue, and for this reason require
special note here. The first of these, the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation
of the Montreal Protocol (Multilateral Fund), is a financial mechanism under the
Montreal Protocol, established to provide financial assistance and technological
transfer to developing countries. The Fund has been influential in terms of
determining the future direction of alternative technologies to ODSs in the
developing world  encouraging the switch to HCFCs and HFCs in those
countries. By the mid-s, the Fund’s Executive Committee began to adopt
fund criteria that took global warming into consideration. As a result,
hydrocarbons and other substitutes with zero ODP and low GWPs attained about
	 percent (cumulative total up to March ) of approved projects in
foam-blowing applications (IPCC ). However, the proportion of technology
using HFCs as refrigerant substitutes remained high   percent in residential
and commercial uses  indicating that on the whole support for HFCs still
accounted for a large market share (IPCC ; Oberthür ). UNEP’s TEAP
report  established to assess the alternative technologies available in terms of
their possibilities for ODS reductions  was another major factor behind the
promotion of HFCs under the Montreal Protocol. At the 
 Meeting of the
Parties, the Nordic countries and Germany, based on their experiences with
hydrocarbon refrigerators in Europe, criticized the conclusion of the TEAP
report, claiming that it offered a slanted assessment of non-halocarbon
substitutes (Parson : 	).
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In the following sections, the roles of Greenpeace Japan and Greenpeace
Germany in influencing the decision making factors of Japanese and German
manufacturers are analyzed in relation to the potential roles environmental NGOs
might play in the development and commercialization of innovative technologies
to solve global environmental problems. Two aspects of Greenpeace Germany’s
campaign emerge in the following discussion: its efforts to win public support and
lobby companies on the one hand, and the concept of “strategic bridging” on the
other. The latter describes the creation of collaborative relationships bridging
stakeholders from the same and/or different sectors for the duration of a limited
shared agenda and proved an innovative and effective strategy in Greenpeace
Germany’s efforts to “green” the refrigerator industry through its breakthrough
hydrocarbon refrigerator technology. For this reason, a detailed discussion of
strategic bridging comprises the final section of this paper.
2. Overview of the Greenpeace non-halocarbon
refrigerator campaign
2.1 Germany
In the late s the German halocarbon manufacturer Hoechst AG accused
Greenpeace Germany of “environmental blindness” that compromised
international efforts to protect the ozone layer, condemning the NGO for its
opposition to the use of CFCs as refrigerant substances. Hoechst AG argued that
Greenpeace was endangering the lives of babies in developing countries by
opposing the technology used to refrigerate, freeze and store essential vaccines
and medicine. Compelled by this criticism to find alternative refrigeration
technology, Greenpeace Germany launched an active search for non-halocarbon
substitutes for refrigeration in . In the same period, CFC manufacturers were
promoting the use of HFCs and HCFCs to the user refrigeration industry, arguing
that in particular for applications of rigid insulation blowing agents and
refrigerants, it was difficult to develop and deploy substances other than HCFCs
and HFCs.
In the early s, consumer appliance makers in Japan and the U.S. switched
from CFC- to HCFC-use for refrigerator insulation blowing agents and from CFC-
to HFC-use for refrigerant. Appliance makers in Germany continued to use CFC
for insulation reducing the amount used by half while switching from CFC-
to HFC-use for refrigerants. In  Greenpeace Germany commissioned the
development of a halocarbon-free refrigerator prototype from two parties: the
first, the Dortmund Institute of Hygiene, a municipal research institute in
Dortmund in the former West Germany, that had developed a hydrocarbon
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refrigeration technology, and the second, DKK Scharfenstein (later privatized as
Foron Domestic Appliances GmbH), a refrigerator manufacturer which made its
own compressors in the former East Germany. Greenpeace Germany gave the
name “Greenfreeze” to the resulting refrigeration technology, completed in July of
that year, and launched a campaign, asking for advance orders on the condition
that the refrigerator would be priced under  Deutschmarks and
commercialized within a year. The campaign was a great success, bringing in
about  advance orders. Treuehandanstalt, the agency responsible for
privatizing previously state-run companies in the former East Germany, had
already decided to dissolve DKK Scharfenstein, but public pressure created by
Greenpeace Germany’s campaign induced the agency to instead provide the
company with funding to assist the commercialization of the new product.
In February  major German manufacturers exhibited hydrocarbon
refrigerator prototypes at the Domotechnica International Trade Fair for
Household Appliances in Koln. The newly privatized Foron Domestic Appliances
GmbH (hereafter Foron) initiated commercialization in March , and was
followed by Bosch-Siemens and other major manufacturers. Bosch asked
Matsushita Refrigeration, which also makes compressors, to supply it with
compressors for hydrocarbon refrigerant (interview with Bosch 	). This order
was completed in September 
 and Matsushita began shipping compressors to
Bosch from its Singapore plant.
In the autumn of , Greenpeace’s ongoing international efforts and public
campaigning resulted in the approval of assistance for hydrocarbon blowing
agent and refrigerants by a technical advisory group of the World Bank, the
largest implementing agency of the Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol.
This helped to fund the deployment of hydrocarbon refrigerators in developing
countries. In March of the following year, China’s first hydrocarbon refrigerant
production facility was completed after a collaboration facilitated by Greenpeace
Germany and Greenpeace International between the German Agency for
Technical Cooperation (hereafter GTZ), the German manufacturer Liebherr, and
Haier, a major manufacturer of refrigerators in China (Stafford and Hartman
	). In February , Foron, Electrolux, Liebherr, and Bosch-Siemens formed
joint ventures and commenced production of hydrocarbon refrigerators in China,
closely followed by other manufacturers such as Kelon, China’s largest
manufacturer (Stafford and Hartman 	). Greenpeace International and
Greenpeace Germany also collaborated with the governments of Cuba and
Germany, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Global
Environmental Facility (GEF), to convert Cuba’s refrigerator factory from using
CFCs to hydrocarbons (Maté 	). By mid-, hydrocarbon refrigerator
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technology had gained an overwhelming  percent share of the German market.
In November  the European Commission revised the eco-label standards for
consumer refrigerators and freezers, excluding refrigerators using HFC
refrigerants. Efforts from national branches of Greenpeace in Britain, Denmark,
the Netherlands, and other countries, working together to popularize Greenfreeze
technology ensured Greenfreeze a market share in the entire European market,
not just in Germany. Currently hydrocarbon refrigerators enjoy an approximately
 percent share of the world market, holding approximately  percent of the
European market and  percent of the Chinese market.
2.2 Japan
In late April  Greenpeace Japan imported hydrocarbon refrigerators from
Germany and held a three-day exhibition in Tokyo. The exhibition was attended
by some  visitors, the majority of whom represented companies, including
major consumer appliance makers. At the time, the official view of the Japan
Electrical Manufacturers’ Association (JEMA) was that domestically produced
refrigerators using HFC refrigerant and HCFC-blown insulation were safer and
therefore better than the new hydrocarbon refrigerators: JEMA argued that the
combustibility of hydrocarbons when combined with the cooling system most
commonly used in Japanese refrigerators presented a fire-risk. Japanese
refrigerators are equipped with automatic defrosters and a contingent cooling
system that differs to systems used in Europe. This results in more electrical
parts that can act as ignition points inside the refrigerator.
After the exhibit Greenpeace Japan launched a consumer postcard-writing
campaign asking refrigerator manufacturers to commercialize hydrocarbon
refrigerators. In addition, staff from Greenpeace Japan visited the Matsushita
Refrigeration Research Institute to exchange views, and in other ways directly
lobbied manufacturers. In April 	 Matsushita Refrigeration commercialized
Japan’s first refrigerator using a hydrocarbon blowing agent for insulation.
Again, as was the case in Germany, other manufacturers were quick to follow.
Currently all refrigerator manufacturers in Japan use hydrocarbon-blown
insulation. However, Matsushita Refrigeration and other manufacturers were
still using HFC refrigerant at that time.
Greenpeace Japan revived its consumer campaign in March 
 after the
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. Focusing on Matsushita Refrigeration, the
Greenpeace campaign included signature-gathering, street campaigning, and
direct action at trade exhibitions to pressure Matsushita Refrigeration to sell fully
halocarbon-free refrigerators. In  a representative from Greenpeace
International and the executive director of Greenpeace U. K. visited Matsushita
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Refrigeration and delivered a document which asked the company to specify
when commercialization of one hundred percent halocarbon-free refrigerators
would take place. The same document requested that commercialization should
begin as soon as possible. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. (MEI) set up a task
unit in  to determine how to respond to Greenpeace Japan’s campaign and
established a Hydrocarbon Technology Committee to make it possible to
announce when hydrocarbon refrigerators would go on sale, contingent on
assuring safety. A month after the task unit’s formation, JEMA’s Environment
Committee approved the start of a voluntary safety standard formulation for
refrigerators using hydrocarbon refrigerants. JEMA drew up voluntary standards
in November , followed in December by further voluntary standards on
safety in distribution, repair, and disposal.
Matsushita Refrigeration announced in November  that it would begin
selling Japan’s first non-halocarbon refrigerators on February , . Rival
manufacturer Hitachi made its announcement at the same time. Toshiba, despite
initial resistance to using hydrocarbon refrigerant, pipped both companies to the
post, launching its new fully halocarbon-free hydrocarbon refrigerator line one
month earlier, in January . Commercialization of halocarbon-free refrigerator
technology had finally arrived in Japan: some nine years after its launch in
Germany. By late December , Matsushita had eliminated halocarbons from
all its refrigerators of  liters or greater capacity ( percent of all consumer
refrigerators).
3. Decision-making factors of major consumer appliance
manufacturers
3.1 Germany
In the early s, German manufacturers were keen to directly shift from CFC
using technology to a final workable solution that would be safe in terms of ozone
depletion, instead of making the transition to another ozone depleting substance
such as HCFC. For this reason, manufacturers continued to use largely reduced
quantities of CFC for insulation blowing, while introducing the use of HFC for use
as a refrigerant. This was viewed only as a temporary step, until a better solution
could be found.
In , two major German manufacturers, Bosch-Siemens and Liebherr
switched to hydrocarbon cyclopentane for insulation blowing. Both Bosch-
Siemens and Liebherr made the switch from using HFC refrigerant to
hydrocarbon refrigerant only six months after switching from CFC to HFC use, in
full knowledge that they would not be able to recover their capital investments in
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HFC refrigerant equipment (interview with Bosch ). Over the course of
interviews conducted by the author with representatives of Bosch and Liebherr
in December , both companies cited Greenpeace Germany’s public campaign
(its activities to galvanize public opinion either directly or through the media or
other channels), market pressure, and commercialization by Foron as three of the
major factors behind their decision to begin the switch to hydrocarbon
refrigerator technology.
The widespread influence of Greenpeace Germany’s awareness campaigns on
manufacturer decision-making was emphasized repeatedly by representatives of
Bosch, Liebherr and GTZ. Greenpeace Germany was credited in particular for its
role in making refrigeration technology using hydrocarbons “socially acceptable”
in Germany. In this respect, Greenpeace Germany’s pro-active approach in
bringing together two parties to engineer breakthrough hydrocarbon refrigerator
technology had played an important role in the NGO’s success at lobbying public
opinion. A set of unique circumstances attending East-West German unification
had converged fortuitously to advance the wide appeal of Greenpeace Germany’s
collaborative initiative. Treuehandanstalt, the aforementioned agency responsible
for privatizing the previously state-owned industries of the former East Germany
was loathed by East Germans for its role in closing down East German companies.
This factor worked to Greenpeace Germany’s advantage, when Treuehandanstalt
targeted DKK Scharfenstein for dissolution (interview with Lohbeck, ).
Greenpeace Germany had struck lucky in its choice of partner. Not only did DKK
Scharfenstein already possess the infrastructure to manufacture its own
compressors  this giving the company the means to experiment with
alternative refrigerants, in comparison with other German manufacturers who
needed to outsource them  but DKK Scharfenstein’s vulnerability made it
desperate for a new product to save it from being dissolved. These factors,
combined with Treuehandanstalt’s negative public image, helped consolidate the
success of Greenpeace Germany’s campaign. The agency attracted severe
criticism from the media: its attempt to stop a Greenpeace Germany and DKK
Scharfenstein joint press conference in  presenting the world’s first
non-halocarbon refrigerator to the public earning it special censure.
Treuehandanstalt was obliged to back down  cancelling DKK Scharfenstein’s
dissolution, promising not to dismiss its workforce, and furthermore lending the
company  million Deutschmarks to assist in the commercialization of the new
product (interview with Lohbeck ; Stafford and Hartman ).
Stafford and Hartman emphasize that the important driver for the promotion
of Greenfreeze in the early stage of its development was Greenpeace Germany’s
reputation. This won the NGO enough support from consumers to put pressure
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on German refrigerator manufacturers and Treuehandanstalt. Interviews with
representatives of Bosch and Liebherr reveal that Greenpeace Germany’s high
public standing gave it a great deal of leverage over manufacturer decision
making, in particular when it focused criticism on specific companies, such as
Bosch, in campaigns covered extensively by the media. Greenpeace’s attentions
were not always coercive: Liebherr was able to gain a large market share after
positive media coverage when it adopted Greenfreeze technology.
3.2 Japan
The release of Greenfreeze technology on the German market in  by
refrigerator manufacturers in the former West Germany prompted major
Japanese manufacturers to begin research and development (R&D) on
hydrocarbon refrigerators. Matsushita Refrigeration had already switched from
CFC- to HCFC-b for insulation blowing, but Greenfreeze’s commercialization
decisively influenced the company’s decision to make a second switch in blowing
agent soon after. Matsushita Refrigeration started R&D of hydrocarbon
refrigerants in April , shortly after Greenfreeze’s commercialization in
Germany. Matsushita Refrigeration was not alone in seizing the initiative. As
aforementioned, Toshiba managed to trump Matsushita Refrigeration in ,
releasing its own fully hydrocarbon refrigerators days ahead of Matsushita,
having set up an advance development unit to identify the hurdles of
hydrocarbon refrigerants and obtained patents in  and .
Japanese consumer appliance makers had considered hydrocarbon
refrigeration as an option over four separate time periods: first, around the
adoption of the Montreal Protocol in 	; second, around the commercialization
of Greenfreeze in Germany and Greenpeace Japan’s subsequent exhibition of
Greenfreeze technology in Japan in ; third, at the time of the adoption of the
Kyoto Protocol in 	; and fourth, the period following Matsushita
Refrigeration’s decision to commence production of hydrocarbon refrigerators,
when the company embarked upon a specific schedule for commercialization as
the result of Greenpeace Japan’s campaigning. Among these factors, Greenfreeze’s
commercialization and the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol were noted as
particularly important by Matsushita Refrigeration. Representatives of the
company admitted that Greenpeace Japan’s campaign had influenced the
company in two key ways: first, boosting Matsushita Refrigeration’s in-house
discussions on eliminating halocarbon use, and second, encouraging the company
in its decision to commercialize eight years earlier than planned.
In May , results were published of a study commissioned by Japan’s
Patent Agency on the number of patent applications into technologies including
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hydrocarbons and other natural refrigerants. The results noted that following
initial increases in the number of patent applications for hydrocarbon
technologies first seen in the early s, the Kyoto Protocol was probably the
determining factor in the soaring number of patent applications for hydrocarbon
technologies submitted in  (Patent Agency : 	). One explanation for the
Patent Agency’s findings is that both German commercialization and the Kyoto
Protocol directly influenced the development of hydrocarbon substitutes.
Interviewees at Matsushita Refrigeration noted that if HFCs had not been listed
in the Kyoto Protocol, Matsushita Refrigeration would probably have continued
using HFC-a in the same way as CFC- was used  focusing their “green”
efforts on the recovery of halocarbons.
Other decision-making factors pinpointed in interviews with representatives
from the Japanese refrigerator industry included (  ) trends in the European
market, (  ) trends in standards by the International Electrotechnical Commission,
(  ) observations of market trends, in which hydrocarbon refrigerant use in
consumer refrigerators was becoming mainstream worldwide, with the exception
of the U. S. market, (  ) market predictions for developing countries (in particular,
in China), ( 	 ) Greenpeace Japan’s argument that HFC recovery was an unrealistic
option in developing countries (this argument proved particularly persuasive to
Matsushita Refrigeration, who up until that point were still discussing whether
problems with HFC use could be solved by recovery and destruction), and
( 
 ) emerging solutions to technical problems in hydrocarbon use related to
system differences, safety, cost and efficiency. Furthermore, although not
mentioned explicitly in the interviews with Japanese manufacturers, the fact that
HFC-related equipment would soon be amortized may well have been an
additional factor in the Japanese context. In this regard, the German manufacturer
Bosch observed that amortization had not been an issue in its decision making
processes in Germany.
To summarize, in Japan it was only after two conditions had arisen  the
Kyoto Protocol and commercialization by German manufacturers that an NGO
was able to directly influence corporate decision-making on the commercialization
of hydrocarbon refrigerator technology. In the German context, major appliance
manufacturers embarked on commercialization in the wake of Greenfreeze
development under the lead of Greenpeace Germany even before the possibility
or likelihood of international HFC controls arose. In Germany, Greenpeace was
able to change the behavior of companies, consumers, and the government,
despite the absence of either legal or economic incentives. This was not the case
in Japan.
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4. NGOs and “strategic bridging” innovation: a Germany and
Japan comparison
4.1 Strategic bridging
Greenpeace is well known for campaign tactics which include non-violent direct
action, political lobbying and public awareness campaigning. Over the course of
the Greenfreeze campaign, Greenpeace tried something new in addition to its
more conventional campaign tactics. By collaborating with new actors both
domestically and internationally, and by forming bridges between those actors,
Greenpeace changed market trends in Germany and Northern Europe and created
new linkages among a number of companies (including German manufacturers
and Calor Gas Limited, the U.K.’s largest LPG supplier), a municipal research
institute (the Dortmund Institute of Hygiene), a government agency (GTZ), and
UN agencies.
The most appropriate concept for understanding these linkages is “strategic
bridging”  a term first introduced by Westley and Vredenburg in  in the
context of analyzing environmental NGO and business collaborations (Stafford et
al. ). Sharma defines strategic bridging as being “characterized by the
presence of a third party as a stakeholder, which is separate and distinct in terms
of resources and personnel from the ‘island’ organizations it serves to link . . .
Unlike mediators, bridgers enter collaborative negotiations to further their own
ends as well as to serve as links among domain stakeholders” (Sharma et al. :
). More recently, Stafford et al. have cited Brown ()’s definition of strategic
bridging as cultivating “a ‘vision’ toward solving problems in contexts
characterized by high stakeholder interdependence and turbulence and identifies
bridging opportunities that may advance that vision” (: ).
In a case study of the Greenpeace-Foron alliance over the development of
Greenfreeze technology in Germany, Stafford et al. argue that expertise in
activism gave Greenpeace Germany the sociopolitical power which led to the
effectiveness of its bridging (: 	). The bridging’s success can be partly
measured in terms of the market and public pressures it galvanized which acted
upon other refrigerator manufacturers: first in Germany and, later, to a lesser
extent, in Japan. The following section offers a detailed discussion of the actors
involved in strategic bridging carried out by Greenpeace Germany and assesses
the effect of strategic bridging on the Greenfreeze campaign. The section ends
with a short analysis of a number of factors which contributed to differences in
the effectiveness of strategic bridging activities carried out by Greenpeace
Germany and Greenpeace Japan.
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4.2 NGOs, strategic bridging and social context
Greenpeace, one of the biggest international environmental NGOs, currently with
some . million members worldwide, conducts campaigns all over the world
through its national offices. Greenpeace’s Greenfreeze campaign, for example,
involved not only European offices, but also offices in Japan, Tunisia and
Argentina, as well as in other countries. Offices share the same goals and in many
cases the same strategies and tactics, and international campaign coordinators
coordinate the worldwide campaign to achieve Greenpeace’s goals, by working
through project coordinators, and regional and national campaigners. As Paul
Wapner explains (: 	), campaigners present the frontline of Greenpeace’s
work, devising the activities to be carried out, and identifying the most effective
ways to communicate with people and change environmentally destructive
practices within their given national or regional context: “Campaigners focus on
the [targeted industries] in their respective countries, taking into account the
governmental cultural, and industrial attributes of each country to address the
problem. . . . They take the general intentions of projects and overall campaigns
and translate them into concrete actions that are tailored for specific
geographical and political contexts.” (Ibid: 	).
This strategy of tailoring actions to local contexts could be seen over the
course of the Greenfreeze campaign. Although Greenpeace Japan implemented
many of the strategies and tactics used by Greenpeace Germany, its overall
strategy placed far less emphasis on “strategic bridging”. This was partly because
Greenpeace Japan lacked the capacity to practice “strategic bridging” as an
organization but also because of the social context in which it was working. To
understand the underlying reasons for these differences it is important to look
both at the differences in the social and political influence of Greenpeace in
Germany and Japan and the nature of relationships between businesses and
environmental NGOs in these two very different social and cultural contexts.
In Germany, Greenpeace enjoyed considerable popularity from the late 	s
into the early 	s; Greenpeace Germany’s post-reunification membership of

				 supporters was in many ways a reflection of the explosion of public
interest in environmental organizations that emerged in response to
transboundary environmental problems affecting Germany, such as acid rain, the
Chernobyl meltdown in 
, and the ozone depletion issue. German citizens’ high
awareness of the environment
 translated into rapidly increasing support for the
German Green Party at the national level, and support for Greenpeace’s radical
and confrontational tactics at the local, regional and international levels. All
these factors gave Greenpeace Germany powerful leverage with which to conduct
its campaign.
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In Japan, on the other hand, the situation for environmental activists is
complex. Schreurs’ analysis of NGO activity in Japan in the early s has
shown that support for environmental NGOs in Japan remains poor and
acceptance-levels from governmental and industrial actors mixed (: ). This
leads to immense differences in the size of membership and resources of NGO
communities in Japan and Germany. Public acceptance of Greenpeace is
particularly low in Japan, moreover: Greenpeace’s ongoing international
anti-whaling campaign has been deeply unpopular with the Japanese public and
media coverage of Greenpeace’s more confrontational actions overseas and the
arrests which sometimes follow them have likewise given Greenpeace a negative
image in Japan. In the transboundary Greenfreeze campaign, as Stafford and
Hartman have pointed out, “A radical image could weaken a group’s bridging
capabilities within some cultures (e. g., Japan), but enhance it in others (e. g.,
Europe)” (: ).
The results of two opinion polls show a clear difference in public perceptions
of international NGOs in Japan and Europe. A report of a public opinion poll
conducted in August  on attitudes to Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) issued
by the Japanese Cabinet Office noted that only 	
 percent of respondents said
that NPOs had a trustworthy image  
 percent saying that they believed
NPOs were untrustworthy. In stark contrast, the results of a  survey
commissioned by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) to determine the trust
that people in Western countries place in NGOs, companies, governments and the
media demonstrated the great trust that Europeans invest in NGOs. Europeans
were found to place trust in these four institutions in the descending order of
NGOs, companies, governments, and the media. In a category which assessed
trust in brands, Americans gave the three top places to Microsoft, Coca-Cola, and
McDonald’s, while Europeans awarded them to Amnesty International, WWF,
and Greenpeace. The percentage of people who would not purchase brands
boycotted by NGOs was 	 percent in the U.S. and  percent in Europe (Edelman
Public Relations ). Although a statistical comparison of these two surveys is
not possible  they were, after all, conducted at different times and by different
methods their results suggest strongly that the level of trust enjoyed by NGOs
in Europe is much higher than in Japan. The following section gives some
indication as to how much different degrees of social trust in NGOs may have
affected the effectiveness of Greenpeace’s Greenfreeze campaign strategies and
tactics in the German and Japanese contexts respectively.
4.3 Greenpeace, strategic bridging and the Greenfreeze campaign
Greenpeace Germany’s most important strategic bridging linked the Dortmund
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Institute of Hygiene with DKK Scharfenstein, as discussed in Section .. In this
case, Greenpeace facilitated collaboration between an institute, which had
already succeeded in developing hydrocarbon refrigeration technology, but did
not have the capacity to develop that technology as a product, and a company
capable of producing compressors for refrigerators that was facing the crisis of
dissolution. The combination was fortuitous: after encouragement from
Greenpeace Germany, DKK Scharfenstein fastened its last hopes for survival on
marketing the Dortmund Institute’s new technology as the world’s first
halocarbon free domestic refrigerators, an arrangement that clearly worked in the
interests of all three parties with Greenpeace Germany acting as a bridge between
the three. This collaborative relationship yielded a large amount of bridging
expertise and technical knowledge to Greenpeace Germany. This in turn was
used to carry out further bridging amongst additional stakeholders afterwards,
when the time came to bring Greenfreeze technology to the world market.
Of these, bridging initiatives with GTZ and the LPG supplier Calor
were particularly important. Inspired by Greenfreeze’s development and
marketing, GTZ had created a department called Proklima in early  to
promote hydrocarbon technology in developing countries. Fundamentally an
organization involved in overseas development aid, GTZ was engaged in efforts
to improve its environmental profile at the time, as noted by Sicars, a
representative of GTZ, speaking in interviews with the author which took place
in . Joining up with the German government, GTZ urged the Multilateral
Fund’s Executive Committee to adopt a new policy of financial assistance for
hydrocarbon technology which would help disseminate hydrocarbon technology
in developing countries. Next, in collaboration with Greenpeace Germany and
German manufacturers, GTZ implemented the Multilateral Fund’s bilateral aid
framework to fund the transfer of Greenfreeze technology to developing
countries. GTZ participated furthermore in meetings of the IPCC, TEAP, and
other organizations, where it offered specialized knowledge on halocarbon and
hydrocarbon technologies.
By contrast, strategic bridging with Calor was instrumental in building up
Greenfreeze’s market share in Europe. In , Calor was inspired by Greenfreeze
to develop hydrocarbon refrigerants for commercial use and to enter the
refrigerant market (Stafford and Hartman ). In cooperation with Greenpeace
Germany, Greenpeace U.K., Greenpeace International, and other Greenpeace
national offices, Calor helped deploy hydrocarbon refrigerant technologies in
Europe. Greenpeace and Calor worked together with manufacturers of
commercial refrigeration equipment and industrial users of commercial
refrigeration equipment the latter including Iceland, a frozen food supermarket
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chain located in the U.K. (Stafford and Hartman ). Greenpeace Germany and
Greenpeace International, in collaboration with Calor, held a series of seminars
on non-halocarbon alternatives as a side-event during intergovernmental
negotiations on climate change, and presented evidence of commercialization of
non-halocarbon alternatives to governments, media and user industries in a
number of different sectors  in each case providing essential knowledge and
information with regard to the alternative technologies offered by the
non-halocarbon refrigeration industry. Calor personnel supplied knowledge as
hydrocarbon experts to a number of standards committees, the scientific working
group of the IPCC and a variety of organizations authoring regulations in various
countries. This expertise was utilized by Greenpeace in arguments with industry
over the flammability and energy efficiency of hydrocarbons and afforded
Greenpeace vital “commercial legitimacy”, as noted by Stafford and Hartman
(). Calor’s laudable contribution to the promotion of Greenfreeze was
presumably measured less in terms of an increased share in potential profit from
business in hydrocarbon refrigerant technology, and more in terms of the
improvements to Calor’s environmental profile which came about over the course
of Calor’s involvement in promoting Greenfreeze technology.
Further acts of strategic bridging carried out by Greenpeace Germany
include the mediations between German and Chinese refrigerator manufacturers
which facilitated collaboration in the production and marketing of hydrocarbon
refrigerators in China, described in Section .. In the Chinese case, as in many of
the cases discussed in this section, the transboundary collaborative relationships
among different stakeholders “bridged” by Greenpeace was enhanced and
expanded by the participation of the various Greenpeace offices in different
countries.
It is important to note that in all the cases discussed in this paper, Greenpeace
Germany’s relationship with other organizations was one of short-term
collaboration with a single common objective or “solutions” agenda (Stafford and
Hartman : ) in mind. One important difference between strategic bridging
and other forms of collaboration is that the bridge must retain “back-home”
commitment from its constituents and remain at all times an independent entity
with its own agenda (Westley and Vredenburg : ; Sharma et al. 	: 	).
This results in a contradiction in the way in which a given company and
environmental NGO entering upon a collaboration perceive their relationship:
while for the company, the NGO will for a certain length of time secure the
company’s competitive edge over other companies, for the environmental NGO,
an exclusive partnership is not in its interest (Stafford and Hartman : ).
In fact, on the day in March 
 that Foron launched Greenfreeze
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commercialization, Greenpeace Germany held a press conference announcing that
it was parting ways with Foron, thereby indicating clearly that it would have
nothing to do with the commercial profit of a certain company. Subsequently
Foron was bested in competition by a company in the former West Germany and
bought out by another European manufacturer. In the second half of  after
Greenfreeze commercialization, Bosch-Siemens replaced Greenpeace Germany as
a strong leader in promoting hydrocarbon refrigerators. In short, Greenpeace
Germany’s efforts were not about promoting the product of a certain company,
but rather, the direction that technology  in this case, non-halocarbon
technology which demonstrated that HFCs were not needed  should take.
By contrast, how did Greenpeace’s strategic bridging work in Japan?
Particularly in the early stages of the Greenfreeze campaign, Greenpeace Japan
diplomatically took a reserved approach, avoiding media attention-catching
confrontational actions that might have deterred manufacturers from looking at
the technological and commercial potentiality of hydrocarbon technologies in
Japan and focusing efforts instead on relaying information and data regarding
Greenfreeze between Germany and Japan. This approach was successful in the
sense that in  Matsushita Electric Industry invited Greenpeace Japan’s staff
campaigner to its annual training seminar for engineers as the keynote speaker
on climate change issues, at a time when the attitude of the rest of the refrigerator
industry remained skeptical about Greenpeace’s role as a transnational
environmental NGO.
Greenpeace Japan’s efforts at strategic bridging lay primarily in bringing
together Calor and related Japanese companies (Stafford et al. ). However,
this mainly consisted of providing information of potential useful contacts in
Japan to Calor, and pooling information from Calor on world trends in
hydrocarbon technology, service manuals and other information sources with
Japanese consumer appliance makers. With Greenpeace Japan taking a backseat,
reasoning throughout that alliances between Calor and Japanese manufacturers
would proceed more smoothly without its involvement, Calor took it upon itself
to build up a cooperative relationship with a Japanese LPG supply company. In
response to interview questions about the knowledge that Calor and its Japanese
partner brought, Matsushita Refrigeration said, “It was beneficial in determining
our orientation and making preparations.”
Greenpeace impacted on Matsushita Refrigeration in a number of ways:
directly, through its consumer campaigns, a number of non-violent direct actions
after , and the provision of knowledge and information, but also indirectly,
during the process of negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol, where Greenpeace held
technical workshops reporting on hydrocarbon technologies and what was
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happening in regard to them in the European  and in particular, German 
market. However, little formation of the kind of strategic bridging seen in Europe
between Greenpeace and companies or manufacturers could be seen in Japan.
The Japanese companies concerned were influenced to a large extent by the
collaborative relationships resulting from strategic bridging by Greenpeace
Germany in Europe, but they did not participate in expanding them. In Japan, as
noted, a Japanese LPG supplier company played a role in bridging between Calor
and Japanese manufacturers, but it is hard to ascertain whether the relationships
created were collaborative, in spite of a certain level of knowledge and
information transfer. It is likely that the development or commercialization of
non-halocarbon alternatives by the Japanese refrigeration manufacturers other
than Matsushita Refrigeration and industry in other sectors happened as the
result of responses to the Kyoto Protocol on the part of various manufacturers,
trends in the European market and Matsushita Refrigeration’s market leading
decisions.
5. Conclusion
Greenpeace Germany had proved the technological and commercial availability
of non-halocarbon alternatives through collaborations with German refrigerator
manufacturers and a municipal research institute. In Germany, in particular, but
also in the rest of Europe, Greenpeace was able to influence the behavior of
industry, consumers and the government in the absence of incentives such as
direct regulatory or economic policies or measures. What made Greenpeace’s
activities effective was continuous expansion of the collaborative relationships
among stakeholders in different sectors built through Greenpeace’s strategic
bridging, and strategic bridging by key stakeholders such as Calor and GTZ, who
were part of the already existing collaborative relationship.
Although Greenpeace Germany and Japan are part of the same international
NGO, differences can be observed in this case study in terms of their influence on
the decision making of manufacturers through the formation of a collaborative
relationship among stakeholders. Evidence would imply that the effectiveness of
strategic bridging by NGOs is greatly dependent on the bridger’s social and
political leverage in the society in which it operates.
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Notes
 Consumption is defined as “(production  import)  export” in the Montreal Protocol.
 A relative index indicating the extent to which a chemical product may cause ozone depletion. The reference level
of  defines the potential of CFC-  and CFC- to cause ozone depletion. “ODP tons” is the number of tons of a
substance multiplied by its ozone depletion potential (Andersen and Sarma : )
 “GWPs are indices comparing the climate impact of a pulse emission of a greenhouse gas relative to that of
emitting the same amount of CO, integrated over a fixed time horizon” (IPCC :  )
 The IPCC is the institution, established in 	 by governments through UNEP and WMO to provide an
authoritative assessment of the state of knowledge concerning climate change.
 A compound derived from methane (CH) and ethane (CH
), in which one or several of the hydrogen atoms are
substituted with chlorine (Cl), fluorine (F) and/or bromine (Br). CFCs, HCFCs and HFCs are examples of halocarbons
(Andersen and Sarma : 	). In this paper, alternatives to ODSs which do not use halocarbons are called
“non-halocarbons”.

 HFC-a is the most popularly used HFC, used in automobile air-conditioners, domestic refrigerators and
commercial refrigeration.
 The IPCC/TEAP Special Report (: ) notes isobutane and HFC-a are the major alternative refrigerants
replacing CFC- in new domestic refrigeration equipment. The two refrigerants are comparable in terms of their
mass production capability for safe, reliable, efficient and economic use.
 The only such provision is for covering “greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol” in Article 
of the UNFCCC, to avoid overlap with the 	 Montreal Protocol.
	 This sequence of events was described by Lohbeck, a Greenpeace Germany campaigner, in interview with the
author in December . The interview was conducted as part of a wider survey of environmental NGOs’ influences
over the decision making of manufacturers in commercializing non-halocarbon refrigerators. In all,  primary
actors in Germany and Japan were interviewed: five present and former Matsushita Refrigeration employees
(including the Directors and General Manager of Matsushita’s Refrigeration Research Laboratory) between October
,  and July , ; one former employee at Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. on October 
, ; one present
and one former employee at the Japan Electrical Manufacturers’ Association on June , ; the former Division
Director and the former chairman (presently JEMA Managing Director) of JEMA’s Environmental Committee on
October , ; the Director of the Business Department at a Japanese LPG supplier on November , ; the
former director of the Ozone Layer Protection Office at the former Ministry of International Trade and Industry on
February , ; four engineers working at Toshiba on July , ; one person from the German Agency for
Technical Cooperation (GTZ) on December , ; one present and two former employees of Bosch on December 
,
; one Liebherr employee on December , ; and finally, Lohbeck from Greenpeace Germany, on December ,
 (“Present” in this context indicates the positions held by interviewees at the time of interview).
 The GEF is an independent financial organization that provides grants to developing countries for projects that
benefit the global environment and promote sustainable livelihoods in local communities (URL: http://www.gefweb.
org/).
 Figures extrapolated from documents received during interviews with representatives of Matsushita
Refrigeration in October  in conjunction with statistics given on the website of the Japan Electrical
Manufacturers’ Association, accessed November , 
: http: //www.jema-net.or.jp/
 Representatives of Toshiba interviewed in  noted that the company had obtained patents from general
research on HFCs, HCFCs, and other substances, and on hydrocarbons in 	. Later, under pressure from the
Montreal Protocol, Toshiba prioritized switching to substances with lower ozone depletion potentials (ODPs), with
GWPs perceived as the next problem to be dealt with. They imported a Foron refrigerator and analyzed its
workings. Toshiba then proceeded with basic non-halocarbon development, and in 		
 and 		 engineers
conducted research on what to do about the difference between direct and indirect cooling in the refrigeration cycle.
 	
 was the year when research and development for replacing CFCs started in Japan. U. S. patent applications
in the same year focused on technologies for the halocarbon substitutes and natural refrigerants (Patent Agency
: ).
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 For example, the isobutane refrigeration cycle turned out to enjoy a higher efficiency than halocarbon using
alternatives (theoretical efficiency is ) (Toshiba interview: July , ).
 The concept of strategic building has been discussed and elaborated by Brown (), Savage et al. (), Stafford
et al. (), Sharma et al. () and Sasaki (), among others.
	 “A June  poll reported in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung found that at the end of November , just prior
to the first elections for a united Germany,  percent of those surveyed said that environmental degradation was the
political problem that concerned them most. This was just below the  percent who answered that their biggest
concern was the danger of war in the Middle East.” (Schreurs : ).

 The largest and oldest internationally oriented group with a predominately environmental focus in Japan is
WWF Japan. In , it had a membership of , up from 

 in . WWF Germany had  members at
that time. Greenpeace Japan’s membership of  in  compared with a membership of  in Germany in
the same year. FoE Japan had a membership of  in the late s; in the same period, FoE Germany’s membership
totaled  (Schreurs : ).
The financial resources held by these NGOs, at the end of the s differed widely. WWF USA enjoyed a budget
of over  million. By contrast, WWF Japan, the richest predominantly environmental NGO in Japan had a
budget of around  million. FoE Japan struggled in the same period on around . Greenpeace Japan’s
budget of  million may seem large in comparison, but it has been heavily subsidized by Greenpeace
International for many years. In comparison, Greenpeace Germany’s budget  comprised entirely of private
contributions and donations  was approximately  million in the same period (Schreurs : ).
 This assessment of Calor’s contribution and the benefits to Calor of participation in the promotion of Greenfreeze
technology was given by Sicars, speaking personally, rather than as the representative of the German Agency for
Technical Cooperation where he was working at the time of interview in .
 The information in this section is based on the author’s own experiences working for Greenpeace Japan as a
campaigner throughout the Greenfreeze campaign between  and 
.
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